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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
LTHOUGH this article discusses developments in the bank-
ruptcy courts, the author limited the cases surveyed to those in-
volving state law (homesteads and exemptions) and other
developments that directly impact enforcement of the debtor-creditor re-
lationship. Except for relevant developments in the Supreme Court,
cases that are limited to an "inside baseball" application of the Bank-
ruptcy Code have been avoided. The focus of this article is on updating
cases of interest to the Texas-based debtor/creditor practitioner.'
Of particular interest this year are legislative developments, both in
Congress and in the Texas Legislature. As this article goes to press, bills
are pending in Congress that will substantially impact (under the guise of
bankruptcy reform) the Bankruptcy Code and availability of relief for
individual debtors. Substantial Texas legislation is already in place that
should impact the nature and extent of real property homestead claims
for local debtors.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. BANKRUPTCY CODE AND OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES
1. Bankruptcy Reform
No significant bankruptcy reform legislation had passed as of the end
of the 1999 Congressional legislative session. Senate Bill S625, however,
passed in early 2000. This bill, which resembles legislation that passed in
both Houses in 1998 would have a far-reaching impact on the bankruptcy
system. Of particular interest to the Texas practitioner is the amendment
that purports to limit state homestead exemption levels claimed by bank-
ruptcy debtors. Specifically, the most recent version of the Senate bill
would have provided a value limitation cap of $100,000 on a state home-
stead claim in bankruptcy. Legislator's efforts to amend the Bankruptcy
1. As a supplement to this review of Texas bankruptcy developments, readers should
review Judge Lief Clark's extensive and thorough analysis of bankruptcy developments in
the Fifth Circuit. See Leif M. Clark, Bankruptcy, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 441(1999); 29 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 355 (1998); 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299 (1997). See also Dean G. Pawlowic,
Banking Law, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 425 (1999); J. Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent Devel-
opments, University of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy Conference (1999); G. Pronske,
Recent Developments, State Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course (1999); F.
Koger, Recent Bankruptcy Cases You Need to Know About, Texas Tech Farm, Ranch &
Agribusiness Bankruptcy Course (1999).
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Code to allow the states to opt out of the legislation were unsuccessful. 2
Although no significant reform legislation actually passed, the situation
is very dynamic and any bill that is reported out of conference committee
could have substantial impact on bankruptcy practice in general, and per-
haps even on state homestead exemptions. Past legislation has been
widely criticized for its impracticality and unintended consequences, thus,
the prudent practitioner is urged to stay aware of legislative
developments. 3
2. Family Farmer Bankruptcies
Chapter 12 was extended for an additional nine months, until June 30,
2000, 4 but its ultimate fate remains uncertain. Given its political nature,
future extensions will likely be passed, and it may even be included in any
meaningful reform legislation.
B. STATE LAw-HoMESTEADS
Texas voters recently approved two constitutional amendments. 5 The
net effect was to expand the urban homestead and to provide for en-
hanced reverse mortgage availability. The resulting amendments to the
Texas Property Code clarify the distinction between urban and rural
homesteads, expand the urban homestead, and make substantial changes
to the urban business homestead.
The Property Code now provides that an urban homestead may be
comprised of up to ten acres. 6 The ten-acre tract must be contiguous and
it must include a business homestead in order to claim the homestead as a
business homestead. 7 A somewhat vague statutory definition of the rural
homestead has now been amended to provide a more specific definition
of the urban homestead. An urban homestead is now statutorily defined
as real property that is located within a municipality, its extraterritorial
jurisdiction, or a platted subdivision; is served by police and fire protec-
tion; and is served by three of the following municipal services-electric,
natural gas, power, storm sewer, or water.8
These amendments are at least in part the result of efforts to clarify the
relatively new home equity loans now available in Texas, but it is too
early to determine the full effect these changes will have on debtors and
creditors and on the claiming of these kinds of exemptions in future
bankruptcy cases. Another amendment to the Property Code indicates
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999).
3. Current legislative highlights are generally available at the American Bankruptcy
Institute's website (visited Jan. 27, 2000) <http://www.abiworld.org>.
4. Extension of Family Farmer Debt Adjustment, Pub. L. 106-70, 113 Stat. 1031
(1999).
5. 1999 Tex. Bal. Meas. 2 (SN).
6. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
7. The new amendment took effect January 1, 2000. But the old urban homestead
law still applies to most liens in place prior to the new effective date.
8. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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that in the event of a conflict between state and federal law regarding a
value limitation for state law purposes, the Texas statute will apply:
The extent of any conflict between this subchapter and any federal
law that imposes an upper limit on the amount, including the mone-
tary amount or acreage limit, of homestead property a person may
exempt from seizure, this subchapter prevails to the extent allowed
under federal law.9
Presumably, this change resulted from recent Congressional efforts to
limit the value of a homestead claim available to bankruptcy debtors.
While the unlimited value of a Texas homestead would clearly be gov-
erned under state law, it is likely that a preemption issue would arise in a
bankruptcy context if such limiting legislation were to become part of the
Bankruptcy Code.
III. BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS
The Court recently addressed an important Chapter 11 reorganization
issue.10 The decision is worth mentioning here even though it does not
directly impact Texas law because the Supreme Court finally addressed
the so-called "new value" exception to the absolute priority rule.11 In
LaSalle, the debtor proposed a capital infusion by the old equity share-
holders, who would become or remain the sole owners of the company
after confirmation. The debtor attempted to cram down the plan over the
objections of a class of creditors.
The Court found that the plan was unconfirmable, not so much because
it invalidated the new equity exception, but because the opportunity to
infuse new capital was exclusively afforded to one group-the old share-
holders. 2 The Court did not absolutely invalidate the new equity excep-
tion, and because of this some commentators have suggested that the
Court left open the possibility of a new value plan being confirmable in a
cram-down process if the other parties in interest were allowed an equal
opportunity to effectively engage in competitive bidding for the new eq-
9. Id. at § 41.008.
10. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership,
526 U.S. 434 (1999).
11. Under the absolute priority rule, the holder of any claim or interest that is junior
to the claims of a class voting against a plan should not receive or retain any claim or
interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1994). See also Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (even if new value exception exists, promise of future work [so
called "sweat equity"] does not qualify as money or money's worth).
12. See LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 1422-23. The Court concluded that:
whether a market test would require an opportunity to offer competing plans
or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same interest sought by old
equity, is a question we do not decide here. It is enough to say, assuming a
new value corollary, that plans providing junior interest holders with exclu-
sive opportunities free from competition and without benefit of market valu-
ation fall within the prohibition of §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. at 1424.
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uity infusion.13
B. HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS
Numerous developments in the bankruptcy case law involving Texas
exemption and homestead claims arose during the Texas Survey period.
For future reference, the reader is cautioned to review these cases, espe-
cially those that focus on the distinctions between urban and rural home-
steads, in the context of the new Property Code amendments.
1. Availability of Homestead to Satisfy Non-Dischargeable Support
Claims
In In re Davis,14 an en banc Fifth Circuit reversed an earlier panel deci-
sion that threatened the viability of the Texas homestead laws.15 Davis'
wife "obtained a [non-dischargeable] judgment from the bankruptcy
court" based on a claim for "alimony, child support, and maintenance. '1 6
She also sought turnover relief, which would have permitted her to fore-
close on the couple's homestead. The bankruptcy court and district court,
successively, found that such relief was not unavailable because the
debtor's homestead was not subject to execution.
An earlier panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision
based upon a somewhat tortured reading of § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code.17 Interpreting § 522(c) in conjunction with state law, the court
ruled that the Davis homestead would be subject to execution. The en
banc panel based its decision on § 522(c), finding that this section of the
Bankruptcy Code did not preempt well-established state homestead
law.18 The court noted that state exemption claims have long been con-
troversial because they have the effect of reducing assets that would oth-
erwise be available to pay claims:
Federal bankruptcy law affords debtors a fresh start by enjoining
collection of discharged debts, § 524, and by permitting the debtors
to retain certain limited amounts and types of exempt property,
§ 522. Exemptions have been perennially controversial, because
they reduce assets potentially available to pay creditors and arouse
charges of abuse of bankruptcy. Exemptions are also fought over by
states'-rights advocates, who value the traditional state legislative
prerogative to adjust exemptions to local economic conditions, and
by advocates of federal uniformity, who want to raise-or lower-
exemptions based on conceptions of national equity. Congress al-
13. See generally ABI Real Estate Committee, A Round Table Discussion: Supreme
Court Decision in 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 389 (1999).
14. 170 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 67 (1999).
15. In re Davis, 105 F.3d 1017 (1997).
16. Davis, 170 F.3d at 477.
17. § 522(c) provides that property exempted under V 522 of the Bankruptcy Code is
not liable for any debt except for a limited category of debts, including those found non-
dischargeable under §§ 523(a)(1) or 523(a)(5) of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (West 1994).
The former wife's claims originally arose under § 523(a)(5).
18. See Davis, 170 F.3d at 481-83.
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layed the controversy between state and federal advocates by provid-
ing in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code that states could opt out of
prescribed federal exemptions altogether or could allow their citi-
zens to select either schedule.
Exemptions are easy to claim. The debtor files a list of exempt
property protected by applicable federal or state law with the court.
If the exemptions are not objected to, the property becomes exempt
and unavailable to be levied on by pre-petition creditors or managed
by the trustee.' 9
But the court nevertheless read § 522(c) to provide that certain claims
to survive bankruptcy and any liens against the property securing those
claims would similarly survive. That does not mean that this Bankruptcy
Code section provides any affirmative relief that could be taken to pre-
empt state exemption law. Even though these unique claims may survive
bankruptcy as non-dischargeable, as well as with the added protection of
§ 522(c), state exemption law is not preempted. Thus, exempt property,
such as the Davis homestead, would not be subject to execution. In ef-
fect, the creditor is left with the available collection remedies under state
law, and no more. The court concluded:
for all these reasons ... § 522(c)(1) does not "create" "liability" of
exempt property for specified debts following bankruptcy. Instead,
the section permits creditors holding such claims to proceed against
the property after bankruptcy based on the rights and remedies they
would have had under state law if bankruptcy had not been filed.20
2. Rural Homestead-Remainder Interest
Debtors Dean and Patricia Eskew 21 claimed a rural homestead interest
in property they had previously conveyed as a life estate to Dean's par-
ents. The couple retained a remainder interest in the property. The trus-
tee and a creditor objected to the claim, arguing that the debtors'
reversionary interest was non-possessory in nature. But, the facts of the
case indicate that the debtors had previously owned the property in fee,
remained in possession of the property at all times, as well as farmed the
property, paid the property taxes, and otherwise cared for it. In other
words, the debtors' use of the property never changed from the time they
moved across the street from it and conveyed the life estate to Dean's
parents.22
The court's analysis acknowledged the requirement of occupancy or
possession by the claimant.2 3 The court began with the presumption that
a reversionary interest in and of itself is not possessory, and would not, by
itself, support a homestead claim. On the other hand, authority cited by
19. Id. at 478 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
21. In re Eskew, 233 B.R. 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998)
22. Id. at 710.
23. Id. (citing Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co., 826 S.W.2d 125, 130 (Tex. 1991)("homestead protection ... can arise only in the person or family who has a present posses-
sory interest in the subject property")).
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the Eskew court did acknowledge the possibility that a person with a pre-
sent possessory right could be entitled to a homestead claim.24 The court
concluded that because the debtors also retained a current possessory in-
terest in the property under an oral lease with Dean's parents, a posses-
sory interest sufficient to support the debtor's homestead claim had been
established.2 5
The Eskew court failed to address the fact that the debtors had appar-
ently moved "across the road" from the subject property some years pre-
petition. In other words, the court did not take into account the manner
in which what appears to be a lack of actual residence on the property
affected the homestead claim. The Brooks26 court did address the issue.
3. Rural Homestead Must Be a "Home" to be a Homestead
The debtor in Brooks lived with his mother in a house that was adja-
cent to (but not on) three tracts of land in which the debtor owned an
interest and claimed a rural homestead. The debtor operated a ranch on
two of the three tracts, and otherwise used the property much like other
rural homestead claimants.
The bankruptcy court acknowledged the traditionally broad and liberal
construction given homestead claims in Texas.2 7 The court did note, how-
ever, a similar Texas policy requiring that "the claimant must reside on
part of the property and use the property for purposes of a home" even
"though the claimant need not reside on all parcels."'28 Before denying
the debtor's homestead claim, the court acknowledged that a present in-
tent to occupy the property, combined with actual preparation toward
occupancy, might provide a sufficient basis for a homestead claim. The
debtor stated that he had "always planned to build a house" on part of
the property but he had made no "preparations toward actual occupancy
and use" of a nature that would support a homestead claim.29
4. Rural Homestead Partially Within a Municipality?
In re Grisham30 is an example of the type of situation that may be
affected by the new urban homestead definition in the Property Code,
although the end result in this case would likely be the same even if the
new definition were applied. The debtors in Grisham claimed an eighty-
24. See Laster, 826 S.W.2d, at 130, n.8; see also Evans v. Mills, 67 F.2d 840 (5th Cir.
1933) (reversionary interest in mineral estate under property in which lessors had been in
uninterrupted possession constituted homestead).
25. Eskew, 233 B.R. at 711-12 (the court noted the general rule that a leasehold may
support a homestead interest).
26. 233 B.R. 696 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
27. Id. at 699. "The rule that homestead laws are to be liberally construed to effectuate
their beneficent purpose is one of general acceptation." Id. (quoting Woods v. Alvarado
State Bank, 19 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1929)).
28. Brooks 233 B.R. at 700 (quoting Riley v. Riley, 972 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1998, no pet.)).
29. Id.
30. 230 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
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acre rural homestead, a portion of which (approximately eleven acres)
was located in a municipality. The court acknowledged the well-settled
liberal construction given homestead claims in Texas. 31 The court noted
that "a person may not have both an urban and a rural homestead, ' 32 and
the debtors had the burden of establishing the rural nature of their
homestead. 33
Under the old statutory scheme, a homestead was considered rural if
the property was not served by municipal utilities and fire and police pro-
tection. 34 The court then analyzed various common law factors similar to
those in the new statutory scheme.35 These determinative factors were
that the property had a designated city street address on a paved and
platted city street; that the property was served by city police and fire;
that the property was served by city water and sewer; and that the prop-
erty had franchised cable television available. 36 Additionally, the prop-
erty was adjacent to conveniences ranging from a hamburger stand and
convenience store to a high school, middle school, and residential subdi-
vision. The court did not determine that the inclusion of a portion of the
property within a municipality was by itself determinative, but in weigh-
ing the totality of the factors described above, the court denied the rural
homestead claim. The court did, however, allow the debtors to exempt
one acre of land.37
One way in which the new Property Code amendments could have af-
fected the outcome in this case is by the new definition of urban home-
stead, under which such homesteads may now consist of up to ten acres.
Hypothetically, had this case been filed after the effective date of the new
amendments, the debtors could have been entitled to exempt ten acres of
their property.38
5. Burial Plots
In addition to the familiar Texas homestead exemption, the Property
Code allows a debtor to exempt a burial plot.39 A single debtor with no
dependents claimed four burial plots as exempt in the recent Preston
case.40 The court was faced with the task of interpreting recent amend-
ments to this portion of the exemption scheme. An older version of the
Property Code provided for an exemption to "one or more lots held for
31. Id. at 531 (citing In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1992)).
32. Id. at 531.
33. Grisham, 230 B.R. at 531; Bradley, 960 at 507. The rural/urban distinction is an
issue of fact. See In re Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1998).
34. Grisham, 230 B.R. at 531 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon
1984)).
35. See id.
36. See id. at 532.
37. Id. 533.
38. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (urban homestead con-
sists of up to ten contiguous acres).
39. A homestead and one or more lots used for a place of burial of the dead are exempt
from seizure. Id. at § 41.001(a) (emphasis added).
40. 233 B.R. 375 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
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use as a sepulcher of a family or single adult who is not a member of a
family."' 41 The old statute provided a more narrow and limited burial plot
exemption than the new, broader statute, which allows "one or more"
lots to be exempted.42
The court was conflicted in its efforts to adhere to the plain meaning of
the new statute, which does not provide a numerical or per capita limita-
tion, while attempting to abide by its perception of the legislative intent.
The court assumed (with no reference to legislative history or other au-
thority) that the legislature intended some reasonable limitation on the
exemption. The court noted that the debtor did not explain the need for
more than one of the exempted plots, 43 so the court denied an exemption
for more than the one lot allowed. As amended, the Property Code does
not limit the number of burial plots owned by a debtor. This appears to
be a case of first impression, so it is uncertain whether future courts will
apply the Preston court's interpretation of the "plain meaning" of this
statute.
6. Annuities
In a 1998 case,44 the debtors claimed as exempt the proceeds of a struc-
tured settlement they received following the death of their two children
in an automobile accident. The structured settlement obligation was as-
signed to a third party, who in turn purchased from an insurance com-
pany a "qualified funding asset" as defined by section 130(d) of the
Internal Revenue Code.45
The debtors claimed their right to future payments under the annuity
under article 21.22 of the Texas Insurance Code, which provides a broad
exemption of interests in a variety of insurance policies and annuities.46
The trustee argued that because the annuity arose out of what was origi-
nally a debtor-creditor relationship, the annuity was nothing more than a
substitute for what would have otherwise been a non-exempt asset of the
bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court was not convinced, and it en-
forced the Property Code exemption as written, noting again the strong
policy of Texas courts favoring exemptions. 47 Based upon what can be
read as an acknowledgment of this policy, together with a literal reading
41. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 1984)).
42. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
43. "[N]o evidence was presented to explain for whom the other plots were being
held." Preston, 233 B.R. at 377.
44. In re Alexander, 227 B.R. 658 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
45. I.R.C. § 130(d) (1999).
46. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. Art. 21.22 (Vernon Supp. 2000). The Insurance Code excep-
tion effectively produces an unlimited exemption for a broad array of insurance benefits,
including cash values and policy proceeds. Id. See, e.g., In re Walden, 12 F.3d 445 (5th Cir.
1994); In re Atkins, 217 B.R. 522 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1997); In re Young, 166 B.R. 854
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994); In re Hosek, 124 BR. 239 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
47. The court commented on this policy by reiterating that
[O]ur exemption laws should be liberally construed in favor of express ex-
emptions, and should never be restricted in their meaning and effect so as to
minimize their operation upon the beneficent objects of the statutes. With-
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of the Insurance Code, the court allowed the exemption claim. 48
7. Tools of the Trade-Products Sold to Third Parties (Computer
Software)
The information age met the Property Code in In re White,49 in which
the debtors claimed an interest in computer software as an exempt tool of
the trade. The debtors created customized software, which they licensed
to third party customers. The software in question was licensed to the
debtor's current employer.
Superficially, it appeared as though the software was used in the debt-
ors' trade or profession, but (as the court noted) it was actually simply a
product sold by the debtors.50 In addition, even though the debtors were
employed by the licensee at the time of the case, the allowance or disal-
lowance of the exemption would have had no impact on that licensee's
continued use of the software.51
C. AUTOMATIC STAY AND ADEQUATE PROTECTION
1. Vehicle Repossession
The debtors in Baker52 were two months in arrears to Nissan when
they filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Four days post-petition, without
knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, Nissan repossessed the debtor's car.
Nissan was thereafter informed of the bankruptcy and the facts indicate
that the debtor's counsel requested that Nissan return the vehicle. Two
months later Nissan moved for relief from the stay. Curiously, while the
motion was pending, Nissan sold the vehicle. Ironically, the bankruptcy
court (unaware of the sale) granted relief from the stay some weeks after
the sale. 53 The debtors filed an adversary proceeding seeking damages
for the stay violation, and the court granted judgment in favor of the
debtors for actual and punitive damages and attorney's fees.54
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, finding
that § 542 of the Bankruptcy Code55 requires "an affirmative obligation
on the creditor to return estate property unless it is of inconsequential
value to the estate, and nothing in § 542(a) requires the debtor to provide
the creditor with adequate protection as a condition precedent to turno-
out doubt the exemption would generally be resolved in favor of the
claimant.
Id. (quoting Carson v. McFarland, 206 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1947, writ ref'd.)).
48. Alexander, 227 B.R. at 661.
49. 234 B.R. 388 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999).
50. See id. at 390.
51. Citing In re Legg, 164 B.R. 69 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994), the court alluded to the
difficulty an employee may have in claiming a tool of a "trade." White, 234 B.R. at 390 n.4.
52. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. v. Baker, 239 B.R. 484 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
53. See id. at 487.
54. See id. at 486. The bankruptcy court allowed Nissan to fulfill the damage portion
of the judgment by providing the debtor with a new pickup.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1999).
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ver." 56 Moreover, the court noted substantial authority for the proposi-
tion that a creditor's continued retention of estate property after notice of
a bankruptcy constitutes an "exercise of control" over property of the
estate in violation of the stay.57
The creditor argued that it did not willfully violate the stay by retaining
the vehicle after notice of the bankruptcy, in part because Bankruptcy
Code § 36358 requires adequate protection of a creditor's interest in col-
lateral. The court discounted this argument, finding instead that the re-
tention and subsequent sale of the vehicle did constitute a willful
violation of the automatic stay. Based on § 362(h), 59 which allows for
actual and punitive damages, as well as costs, and attorney's fees, the
court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment.60
Readers may recall the facts of In re Zabes,61 in which Chief Bank-
ruptcy Judge McGuire confronted the more conventional quandary of a
creditor who repossessed a debtor's car pre-petition. Although the repos-
session itself did not violate the stay, Judge McGuire found a stay viola-
tion when the creditor subsequently refused to return the vehicle. The
creditor in Zabes faced a situation in which previous authority supported
a possessory lien claimant's retention of a car, so it is understandable that
this creditor raised adequate protection issues. On the other hand, the
creditor's conduct in Baker, which occurred primarily post-petition and
after notice, remains inexplicable.
2. Chapter 13-Adequate Protection in Late Confirmation Districts
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
within a relatively short time after the case has been filed. But in certain
districts, local practice has evolved to a point where confirmation of a
debtor's plan does not occur until many months after the filing. This
practice is purportedly justified by the fact that some courts prefer to
allow the deadline for filing claims to expire. A major drawback to this
approach is that although the debtor presumably makes monthly pay-
ments to a Chapter 13 trustee, most secured creditors are left without
adequate protection payments for a lengthy period pending confirmation.
Confirmation also occurs later than contemplated by the Bankruptcy
Code.
The Eastern District of Texas is one of these so-called "late confirma-
tion" districts. In In re Rogers,62 Judge Bill Parker addressed the di-
lemma of creditors left without adequate protection. A creditor with a
56. Id. 489.
57. See id. at 488 (citing In re Zaber, 223 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (post-
petition repossession is unquestionably a violation of the automatic stay)); see also Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Reed, 154 B.R. 471 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1999).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1999).
60. Baker, 239 B.R. at 490-91.
61. 223 B.R. 102 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
62. 239 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
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security interest in the debtor's automobile moved for relief from the au-
tomatic stay, arguing a lack of adequate protection of its interest in the
vehicle. In the alternative, the creditor sought interim adequate protec-
tion payments. The creditor's situation was aggravated by the debtor's
use of the vehicle to make a daily sixty-mile commute to work.
The court reviewed the practical burdens of proof and persuasion in a
stay proceeding, noting that although the non-movant (typically the
debtor) bears the burden on all issues except the existence of equity in
the property, the movant must nevertheless sustain "an initial burden of
production or going forward with the evidence to establish that a prima
facia case for relief exists before the respondent is obligated to go for-
ward with its proof."' 63 In Rogers, the court found that the creditor did
not establish its prima facia case for relief because it failed to present
evidence regarding the debtor's lack of equity. Therefore, the burden of
establishing the necessity of an effective reorganization never shifted to
the debtor.64
The court next addressed the issue of relief from the stay "for cause,"
including a lack of adequate protection. A creditor establishes its prima
facia case by proving that it holds a claim secured by a valid, perfected
lien, and that a decline in the collateral's value is occurring or threatens
to occur due to the existence of the automatic stay. Once the prima facia
case is presented, the burden shifts to the debtor to prove that the collat-
eral is not declining in value, or that the secured creditor is otherwise
protected. 65
After conducting an in-depth analysis of adequate protection, the Rog-
ers court pointed out the difficulty faced by a secured creditor in a late
confirmation district. Specifically, it observed that under this practice,
the risk of failure of a Chapter 13 plan is placed entirely upon secured
creditors. Under a strict reading of the Bankruptcy Code, not only are
payments to the trustee allowed to accrue in its possession, but the "first
available funds" are typically reserved for the debtor's counsel. 66 The
court next attempted to establish a means by which this burden could be
distributed more equally. It ultimately concluded that the debtor would
be required to modify her Chapter 13 plan. Following payment of the
Chapter 13 trustee's fees, the funds distributed under the confirmed plan
would be halved, with one half of the funds to be distributed equally
among the creditor and any other parties authorized to share in such a
distribution. The other half of the funds would be distributed equally
among the debtor's counsel and other similarly situated claimants. This
distribution scheme would remain in place until the administrative claims
had been paid in full. In the situation where a case is dismissed or con-
verted, the court ordered that disbursements should proceed under a sim-
63. Id. at 886 (citing In re Kowalsky, 235 B.R. 590, 594 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999)).
64. Id. at 887.
65. See id. at 887 (citing Kowalsky, 235 B.R. at 595).
66. Id. 239 B.R. at 889.
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ilar fifty-fifty arrangement rather than having the trustee disburse monies
back to the debtor.67 Continuation of the automatic stay was conditioned
on the debtor retaining full coverage insurance on the vehicle, limiting
the persons allowed to operate the vehicle, and remaining current on all
Chapter 13 plan payments. The court imposed a one-time, ten-day notice
and opportunity to cure default. Beyond that, the automatic stay would
terminate in the event of the debtor's default.68
The author recommends that all Texas practitioners who deal with se-
cured claims in consumer bankruptcies, especially in the Eastern District,
become familiar with the opinions in Rogers as well as those in the 1999
cases of In re Kowalsky69 and In re Self.70
D. DISCHARGEABILITY
1. Credit Card Debt
No Annual Survey bankruptcy law review would be complete without a
discussion of yet another credit card issuer attempting to have a credit
card debt declared non-dischargeable. The credit card issuer in In re
Akins71 solicited the debtor's business based on the debtor's credit rating
score provided by a credit bureau used by the issuer. According to the
court, none of the information obtained and relied upon by the issuer was
received or requested from the debtor.72 The credit card application con-
tained no warranties or representations, nor did the debtor sign any
agreement requiring disclosure of any change in her financial condition,
job status, or gross income.
The particular form of the solicitation was an unsolicited "check" from
the issuer, which the debtor received at a time when her financial condi-
tion had deteriorated. Although the debtor had met the credit limit on
her other credit cards, the other issuers failed to report that information
to the credit bureau. When deciding to send the unsolicited check, the
issuer apparently relied on inaccurate or stale information. This informa-
tion originated from the credit bureau, and not from the debtor herself.
The issuer attempted to rely on In re Boydston,7 3 a pre-Bankruptcy
Code opinion that (in dicta) allowed "[w]here hopeless insolvency at the
time of the purchases makes payment impossible, fraudulent intent may
be inferred."'7 4 But the bankruptcy court found Akins distinguishable
from Boydston because the Atkins debtor made no false representation to
67. See Rogers, 239 B.R. at 893.
68. See id. at 893. The court also found that confirmation of a plan that did not con-
tain the fifty-fifty language described above would constitute an automatic termination of
the stay. Id.
69. 235 B.R. 590 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999).
70. 239 B.R. 877 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1999) (establishing the burden of proof in motions
to lift stay).
71. 235 B.R. 866 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1999).
72. Id. at 869.
73. 520 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 1101; see also Akins, 235 B.R. at 872 n.4.
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
the credit card insurer. To the contrary, she went so far as to disclose to
the issuer's representative her problems with making payments on other
bills. The debtor also asked the issuer if she could use the check proceeds
to pay those bills and in effect consolidate the payments, to which she
received an affirmative response. The issuer relied solely on the debtor's
credit bureau score in issuing the unsolicited offer of credit. The Akins
court even adopted Northern District Judge Akard's theory of "commer-
cial entrapment. '75 In conclusion, the court found that the extension of
credit to the debtor was the issuer's own fault:
[N]egligent lending practices and the industry's negligent use of a
faulty .. .system ...has been engineered to create the greatest
amount of credit for the greatest number of working people in this
country with artificially low monthly repayment requirements so that
credit card companies can make the greatest amount of interest and
profits possible.76
Accordingly, the court found that the action was not substantially justi-
fied and awarded the debtor attorney's fees.77
2. Chapter 13 Confirmation-No Partial Surrender of Collateral
In In re Williams,78 a Chapter 13 debtor moved to modify her debt
adjustment plan to allow her to surrender a portion of the collateral se-
curing a claim, while at the same time continue to make plan payments
on the value of other remaining collateral securing the same claim. The
court acknowledged that a debtor could confirm a plan over a secured
creditor's objection if the plan proposed a full surrender of all collat-
eral.79 Alternatively, the debtor could confirm a plan under which all
collateral is retained and present value payments are made in accordance
with the Bankruptcy Code. 80 The hybrid approach suggested by the
debtor was not contemplated by the plain meaning of the statute, espe-
cially in the context of satisfying an undersecured creditor's claim, and
therefore was not available. The net effect of the Williams decision is that
at least in the Chapter 13 context, a debtor may not satisfy an under-
secured creditor's claim by surrendering a portion of the collateral secur-
ing a creditor's claim while making payments under a plan based on the
value of the retained collateral. 81
75. Adkins, 233 B.R. at 872 (quoting In re McDaniel, 202 B.R. 74, 79 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1996)). See Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, 50 SMU L. REV. 989,
1007 (1997) for a discussion of McDaniel.
76. Akins, 233 B.R. at 874.
77. Id. at 875-76.
78. 168 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 1999).
79. See id. at 847.
80. See id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994) (describing Chapter 13 plan confirmation
requirements).
81. The debtor cited numerous cases in which claims were satisfied by a combination
of a transfer of goods and payment of cash. But the Fifth Circuit distinguished those cases
by pointing out that in these situations, creditors were oversecured, and the partial transfer
resulted in a full satisfaction of the debt. See Williams, 168 F.3d at 848 (citing First Bran-
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E. CROP INSURANCE PROCEEDS-FEDERAL PREEMPTION
AND STATE LAW
A secured party in In re Cook 82 claimed an interest in the proceeds of a
debtor's cotton crop insurance indemnity payment. Under federal regu-
lations (which pre-empt state law) 83 a written assignment of the right to
receive payment must be filed with the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion (FCIC) to be effective. 84 The secured party had a perfected security
interest in the debtor's cotton crop and its proceeds, but no written as-
signment of the program payment proceeds had been filed. The debtors
received the insurance payment and filed for Chapter 7 relief shortly
thereafter.
The Fifth Circuit found that the federal statute giving rise to the FCIC
prohibited liens on policy proceeds "before payment to the insured. '85
This regulatory scheme did not, however, bar a security interest in the
proceeds themselves. Accordingly, once the proceeds came into the
debtor's hands, the secured creditor's interest in the insurance became
the same as its interest in the crop proceeds.86
In In re Rees,87 which preceded the Cook decision, Judge John Akard
applied a similar analysis and reached the same conclusion. As in Cook,
the specific assignment provisions in Rees dealt with a creditor's right to
proceeds before the debtor received them. In Rees, however, Texas law
governed the secured creditor's rights in the proceeds once they came
into the debtor's hands. 88
IV. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. LIEN FORECLOSURE
1. No Damages for Loss of Opportunity to Do Business with Potential
Purchaser
In Peterson v. Black,89 the assignee of a note caused a trustee's sale to
be conducted following the maker's default. At the sale, the substitute
don Nat'l Bank v. Kerwin, 996 F.2d 552 (2nd Cir. 1993); In re Lairmore, 101 B.R. 681
(Bankr. E.D. Ok. 1988)).
82. 169 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999).
83. See id. at 275.
84. See id. at 274-75 (stating that "claims for indemnity are not subject to attachment
or other legal process 'before payment to the insured"' on account of a debt of the
insured).
85. Id. at 276.
86. See id. at 277. The Fifth Circuit noted that whether the security interest specifi-
cally mentioned insurance proceeds was not relevant. Under state law, insurance proceeds
are proceeds of that collateral. See id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(a)
(Vernon 1991 & Supp. 2000); Sweetwater PCA v. O'Briant, 764 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1988).
87. 216 B.R. 551 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
88. Id. at 555. Rees dealt with proceeds already in the hands of the debtor. As the
court noted, "'complete preemption' [of state law] means something less than complete."
Id. Where federal law stops, state law applies. Thus, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) governs proceeds in the debtor's hands.
89. 980 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no writ).
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trustee bid on behalf of the holder. The trustee's deed, however, was not
recorded. The debtor sued the substitute trustee and the purchaser, alleg-
ing that he had found another purchaser who would have bought land at
a higher price than the credit bid at the foreclosure sale. The debtor as-
serted that since the trustee precluded other purchasers from bidding, a
fair sale was not conducted.90 The debtor sought relief based on the loss
of conducting business with a potential purchaser. In one defensive the-
ory, the trustee asserted that the sale had never been completed because
the trustee's deed was never recorded. Despite this fact, the appellate
court found that the sale was complete. 91 Nevertheless, the court refused
to authorize a recovery of damages on the debtor's claimed loss of doing
business.92
2. Disposition of Collateral
The case of SMS Financial, LLC v. Abco Homes, Inc.93 provides an
example of what can go wrong in a Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) note sale transaction. The FDIC sold, but did not physically
deliver, a note to SMS Financial (SMS). SMS later requested a refund,
but instead the FDIC sent the note to SMS. Shortly thereafter, SMS sued
the maker of the note, arguing that it was the holder of the note through
the FDIC's negotiation and delivery, and therefore was the party entitled
to enforce it.
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Texas Business and Commerce Code
§ 3.301 to find that SMS was the holder of the note;94 SMS became the
holder when the FDIC negotiated and delivered the note to it.95 The
court found that a genuine issue of material fact had been raised regard-
ing the commercial reasonableness of the sale of the equipment being
used as collateral, reiterating that SMS had the burden of proof on the
issue. 96 The maker also asserted that the note was barred by limitations,
but the court found that both the general federal statute of limitations97
and FIRREA 98 applied in this case. The court went on to note that
90. A trustee or substitute trustee must conduct a sale fairly, "with absolute impartial-
ity," and he may not discourage bidding. Id. at 822. Having said that, however, a trustee
need not "take affirmative actions beyond that required by the deed of trust," and his
"duties are fulfilled by complying with the deed of trust." Id. (citing First State Bank v.
Keilman, 851 S.W.2d 914, 924-25 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied)).
91. See Peterson, 980 S.W.2d at 822.
92. Peterson, 980 S.W.2d at 822-23.
93. 167 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1999).
94. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (Vern. Supp. 1994 & 2000).
95. Under the UCC, SMS became the holder of the note even if delivery of the note
was inadvertent. As the holder, SMS was entitled to enforce the note. See SMS, 167 F.3d
at 239.
96. See SMS at 243 (citing Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W.2d
173 (Tex. 1992)).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) (1994).
98. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(d)(14) (1994).
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§ 2415, the general statute, actually contains a specific tolling provision.9 9
3. Fraudulent Transfers
Bahr v. Kohr1 00 was originally filed under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA). 10 1 In this case, a judgment debtor and his spouse
purchased certain real property during their marriage. The debtor con-
veyed a portion of that property to his spouse as her separate property,
and both spouses designated the remaining portion of that property as
their homestead. The judgment creditors claimed that this conveyance
violated the UFTA.
The court found that the general denial filed by the judgment debtors
was sufficient to raise a defense that the property in question was pur-
chased with separate property funds of the non-judgment debtor's
spouse. But the court determined that the judgment debtor and his
spouse bore the burden of rebutting the presumption that the property
was community in nature by clear and convincing evidence, which in-
volves tracing and identifying the specific funds used to purchase the
property. 10 2 Since the debtor and his spouse failed to overcome that pre-
sumption by sufficiently clear and convincing evidence, the case was
remanded. 0 3
B. FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT-AGENTS
Collection practices were at issue in the case of a debtor who pur-
chased a satellite dish and television set from a retail store on credit. 10 4
The debtor's account was sold to a finance company, which began billing
the debtor. Dunning phone calls followed, despite the fact that the
debtor no longer owed money on the satellite dish account. The store's
wholly-owned finance company turned the account over to a collection
agency, which had contracted with the original holder to work as an inde-
pendent contractor. The new collector began making "harassing and
threatening" phone calls, and the debtor finally sued under the Texas
Debt Collection Act 10 5 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.10 6
99. See SMS, 167 F.3d at 240-42. In disposing of this issue, the court relied on Mid-
states Resources Corp. v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Service, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D.
Tex. 1996), which was the first published case to apply the tolling provisions of the old
federal statute to a FIRREA-covered debt. As an aside, the Midstates court cited an ear-
lier issue of the Annual Survey of Texas Law. Id. at 1426 n.3 (citing Roger S. Cox, Bank-
ruptcy & Creditor's Rights, 48 SMU L. REV. 875, 408 (1995)).
100. 980 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998).
101. TEX. Bus. COM. CODE ANN. § 24.001 (Vernon 1987).
102. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 728; see generally, McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540,
543 (Tex. 1973); McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
103. See Bahr, 980 S.W.2d at 729-30.
104. See Morante v. Am. Gen. Fin. Ctr., 157 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 5069-11.01 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2000).
106. 15 USC § 1692 et. seq. (1994 & Supp. 1996).
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The Fifth Circuit found that the phone calls made by the financing
company and the subsequent collector were harassing and threatening to
the extent that they supported a jury verdict awarding several thousand
dollars in damages. 10 7 More importantly, the court determined that the
finance company controlled most aspects of the relationship with the
debtor, including the time and manner of contacts with the debtor, re-
porting requirements, settlement approval, and initiation of litigation. 10 8
The court found sufficient evidence that the collector was the finance
company's agent, which exposed the finance company to liability for the
collector's actions and for exemplary damages under the state statute. 109
Perhaps even more significant than what the court did is what the court
did not do. It appears that the facts of this case presented the Fifth Cir-
cuit with an opportunity to impose a non-delegable duty on the owner of
the debt to comply with the debt collection statute. But the court's in-
depth factual analysis of the agency relationship between the creditor and
the collector indicates that the court declined to impose any non-delega-
ble duty beyond that which already exists by statute.
107. See Morante, 157 F.3d at 1009-11.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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